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To some observers, the attitude of the law of England and Wales 
towards illegally obtained evidence represents a sensible and practical 
compromise between two moral positions; to others, a dangerous moral 
incoherence.  Whichever view is adopted, it is clear that the existing 
approach offers little in the way of guiding principle.  In a major recent 
case the highest appeal courts were presented with a set of difficult 
questions to which existing precedent supplied no clear answer. 
In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a number of 
appellants objected to a series of decisions by the Home Secretary that 
appellants should be refused entry to the country, detained on the 
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grounds that they were suspected of terrorism, or both.1  The appellants 
claimed that the evidence against them had been obtained by torture, not 
of themselves, but of other suspects held and interrogated in a variety of 
countries around the world.2  Such denunciations were, they argued, 
unreliable and inadmissible as evidence.3  Nevertheless, the Special 
Immigration Appeals Tribunal (SIAC), whose function was to decide 
each case ab initio rather than consider the reasonableness of the minister’s 
decision, relied partly on the disputed evidence.4  The minister’s decisions 
were upheld.5  The appeals from the SIAC involved a number of awkward 
but intriguing issues: the initial decision had been taken as part of an 
executive, rather than a judicial, function; no criminal court had been 
involved; the courts were not being asked to consider a confession made 
by a defendant in a trial; and any improprieties in investigations were not 
attributable to agents of the government.6
The Court of Appeal held that although for the State to take advantage 
of such actions by its own servants would be an abuse of process, this 
was not the case in relation to the transgressions of agents of other 
states.7  The House of Lords disagreed.8  To Lord Bingham, the argument 
was not about the law of evidence but of constitutional principle.9  Lord 
Bingham stated, “English common law has regarded torture and its fruits 
with abhorrence for over 500 years, and that abhorrence is now shared 
by over 140 countries which have acceded to the Torture Convention.”10  
Evidence so obtained is “unreliable, unfair, offensive to ordinary standards 
of humanity and decency and incompatible with the principles which 
should animate a tribunal seeking to administer justice.”11  However, 
information extracted by torture could legitimately inform police investigation 
or other executive activity.  The difference between the two functions is 
not entirely clear.  Lord Nicholls noted that in particular circumstances 
executive action can have at least as significant an impact upon an 
individual as prosecution in the criminal court; for example, deportation 
could have long-term consequences for the subject.12  Yet, with ever-
 1. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123, (2005) 1 W.L.R. 414, 414, rev’d, [2005] UKHL 71, 
[2006] 2 A.C. 221 (H.L. 2005) (appeal taken from U.K.). 
 2. Id. at 414. 
 3. Id. at 443. 
 4. Id. at 434, 441. 
 5. Id. at 419. 
 6. Id. at 414. 
 7. Id. at 415. 
 8. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No 2), [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 
A.C. 221 (H.L. 2005) (appeal taken from U.K.). 
 9. Id. at 270 (Lord Bingham). 
 10. Id. at 269. 
 11. Id. at 270. 
 12. Id. at 277 (Lord Nicholls). 
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deepening rhetoric, he made the case for a distinction between the two 
processes.  It would be “absurd,” he argued, to reject evidence obtained 
by torture if it might save lives: 
If the police were to learn of the whereabouts of a ticking bomb it would be 
ludicrous for them to disregard this information if it had been procured by 
torture.  No one suggests the police should act in this way.  Similarly, if tainted 
information points a finger of suspicion at a particular individual: depending on 
the circumstances, this information is a matter the police may properly take into 
account when considering, for example, whether to make an arrest. 
   In both cases the executive arm of the state is open to the charge that it is 
condoning the use of torture.  So, in a sense, it is.  The government is using 
information obtained by torture.  But in cases such as these the government cannot 
be expected to close its eyes to this information at the price of endangering the 
lives of its own citizens.13
However, once the decision falls under the review of a court of law, 
“the honour of our courts and our country” becomes an issue.14  
Although the decision to deport or detain may have been an executive 
one at the outset, the scrutinizing role of the SIAC was a judicial function.  
The tribunal may not allow tainted evidence to inform its proceedings, only 
partly because it is unreliable.  Lord Hoffmann declared that the use of 
torture is dishonourable: “It corrupts and degrades the state which uses it 
and the legal system which accepts it.”15  Lord Hope cited Justice Jackson’s 
dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United States: “[O]nce judicial approval 
is given to such conduct, it lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the 
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an 
urgent need.”16  Since the purpose of the rule is not to discipline the 
agents of the State but to “uphold the integrity of the administration of 
justice,” it is irrelevant that in the present case the agents of a different 
state were involved.17
 13. Id. at 276. 
 14. Id. at 282 (Lord Hoffmann). 
 15. Id. at 279. 
 16. Id. at 287 (Lord Hope) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
 17. Id. at 281 (Lord Hoffmann). 




I.  THE BACKGROUND 
Confession evidence in criminal trials falls within territory competed 
over by a large number of possibly incompatible interests, including the 
human rights of the suspect and the protection of society.  It has been 
said that the law considers reliability the most important requirement of 
confession evidence.18  While the common law recognized that confessions 
obtained through coercion or promise of benefit were of little evidential 
value, English courts have done little in order to ensure the reliability of 
confession evidence and verdicts founded on confession evidence.  At 
the same time, the elaborate structure of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (PACE), and the Codes of Practice issued under its aegis, 
prompt the question of how the scheme for the regulation of police 
investigation is to be enforced.19  Courts in England and Wales appear to 
regard the use of exclusionary rules of evidence to deter the police from 
unlawful practices as a separate, and less acceptable, matter from 
excluding evidence in order to preserve the moral integrity of the 
criminal justice system itself. 
II.  DISCIPLINING THE POLICE 
The Phillips Report rejected the argument that it was necessary to 
exclude unlawfully obtained evidence as a sanction against improper police 
conduct.20  The intended result would be best achieved by “contemporaneous 
controls and good supervision” and “effective arrangement for the 
investigation of complaints against the police,” plus the usual civil 
remedy.21  Judges have been consistent in their emphasis that deterrence 
of unlawful conduct is not an appropriate role for the rules of evidence.  
For example, in R v. Mason, police officers falsely told the defendant 
while he was being questioned that his fingerprints had been found on a 
piece of glass from the bottle used to start the fire under investigation.22  
They told his solicitor the same lie.23  Lord Justice Watkins insisted that 
although the evidence should be excluded, it was no role of the court to 
 18. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, EVIDENCE (GENERAL) 11TH REPORT, 
1972, Cmnd. 4991, at 35, para. 56.  Mirfield suggests that the more extreme examples of 
exclusion of perfectly reliable confessions at common law were the result of a preference 
for generalized principles rather than scrutiny of the facts of each case.  PETER MIRFIELD, 
CONFESSIONS 62 (1985). 
 19. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984. 
 20. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, 1981, Cmnd. 8092. 
 21. Id. at para. 4.118–4.119. 
 22. R v. Mason, (1987) 3 All E.R. 481, 481. 
 23. Id. 
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discipline the police; nevertheless, he thundered, “[W]e think we ought 
to say that we hope never again to hear of deceit such as this being 
practised on an accused person, and more particularly possibly on a 
solicitor.”24  Arguments are couched in terms of reliability or fairness rather 
than of discipline or deterrence.  In R v. Quinn, Lord Lane C.J. said: 
[T]he function of the judge . . . is to protect the fairness of the proceedings.  
Normally proceedings are fair if a jury hears all the relevant evidence which 
either side wishes to place before it, but proceedings may become unfair if, for 
example, one side is allowed to adduce relevant evidence which the other side 
cannot properly challenge or meet, or where there has been an abuse of process, 
e.g. because evidence has been obtained in deliberate breach of procedures laid 
down in an official code of practice.25
Perceptionis of fairness, however, may be changing.  In Mason, the 
confession was excluded under section 78 of PACE, which gives the 
court discretion to exclude if it considers that the admission of the evidence 
would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings.26  
Here the burden rests on the defense to convince the court that potential 
unreliability should prevent the confession from being admitted into 
evidence.  The unfairness arose principally because, as a result of the 
deception, Mason’s solicitor advised Mason to explain himself to the 
police, and therefore his right to silence was undermined.27  The Court of 
Appeal considered that the function of the solicitor in the police station 
is ultimately to remind the suspect of his rights, and in particular of the 
right to silence.28  A legal advisor who is misled cannot exercise this 
role.  However, the right to silence itself has since been undermined by 
Parliament, through the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994, casting doubt on the reasoning in Mason.29  The 
usefulness of access to legal advice on arrest is now a matter of debate.  
The case law on these provisions has produced the following situation: 
where the legal advisor recommends silence, failure to respond may 
 24. Id. at 485. 
 25. R v. Quinn, [1990] Crim L.R. 581, 583.  Cf. Lam Chi-ming v. R, [1991] 2 A.C. 
212, 222 (P.C. 1991) (appeal taken from H.K.) (Lord Griffith) (“[I]t would make a grave 
inroad upon [the privilege against self-incrimination] if the police were to believe that if 
they improperly extracted admissions from an accused which were subsequently shown 
to be true they could use those admissions against the accused for the purpose of 
obtaining a conviction.”). 
 26. Mason, (1987) 3 All E.R. at 481. 
 27. Id. at 483, 484. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, §§ 34–37 (Eng.). 




nevertheless be taken as evidence of guilt, if the advice was not the 
primary reason for the silence.  Thus, if the reason for the silence is, in 
the opinion of the finder of fact, that the defendant had no answer 
because he is guilty, an inference of guilt may be drawn.30  If the 
solicitor explains to the trial court the reason for his advice, such as that 
the police did not disclose their evidence to him at the interview, he 
waives his lawyer-client privilege and may be asked questions about 
admissions his client made to him.31
Hence it may no longer be possible to regard the right to silence as a 
key element in the fairness of the investigative process leading to trial.  
Fairness is, in any event, an elusive concept.  The jurisdiction of 
England and Wales has, like the United States, generated its own case 
law on fairness in terms of “virtue-testing,” where government agents 
offer inducements to commit crime.32  In some of the English cases, the 
importance of the reliability of evidence is stressed, but the spectre of 
crime, which is truly state-created, produces sufficient outrage to suggest 
that a case should be stayed for abuse of process.33  Despite the 
vagueness of the fairness principle, in A v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department the House of Lords stressed that the fairness of 
process, rather than the deterrence of illegitimate methods of interrogation 
and investigation, is the courts’ primary concern.34  Hence it was not 
significant that any torture employed at any stage had occurred outside 
the United Kingdom. 
III.  RELIABILITY? 
The provisions of PACE itself clearly envisage the exclusion of 
confession evidence even where it is entirely reliable.  Section 76A(2)(b)35 
provides that a court must exclude a confession that was or may have 
been obtained by oppression or “in consequence of anything said or done 
which was likely . . . to render unreliable any confession which might be 
made by him in consequence thereof,” unless the prosecution proves to 
the court beyond reasonable doubt that “the confession, notwithstanding 
 30. R v. Condron, (1997) 1 W.L.R. 827, 827; R v. Beckles, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 
2766, (2005) 1 All E.R. 705, 718–19. 
 31. R v. Bowden, (1999) 4 All E.R. 43, 48. 
 32. E.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); Hampton v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
 33. Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999), [2001] 2 A.C. 91 (H.L. 2000) 
(appeal taken from U.K.). 
 34. [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221, 228, 233 (H.L. 2005) (appeal taken from 
U.K.). 
 35. Section 76A deals with confessions by the co-accused. 
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that it may be true, was not obtained as aforesaid.”36  There have been 
cases where it has become clear that the confession was indeed true, as 
where an accused admitted guilt at the voir dire held to ascertain the 
admissibility of the confession.37  Here, neither the confession nor the 
admission of guilt at the voir dire is admissible.  In R v. Brophy, the 
House of Lords argued that to allow the admission of guilt made in the 
absence of the jury to be given in evidence at the substantive trial would 
curtail the freedom an accused person ought to enjoy to give evidence at 
the voir dire of any improper means used by the police during questioning.38  
This principle was applied to the question of cross-examining the 
accused on discrepancies between what was said at the voir dire and 
subsequent testimony during the substantive trial.39  In Wong Kam-Ming 
v. The Queen, it was held that prosecution counsel can take no advantage 
from an admission of guilt at the voir dire.40
The Criminal Law Revision Committee argued that reliability was the 
dominant common law principle; hence, evidence discovered as a result 
of a confession obtained by threats or promises should be admissible, 
even though the confession itself was not.41  The common law position 
was restated in section 76A(4) of PACE: “The fact that a confession is 
wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of this section shall not affect the 
admissibility in evidence . . . of any facts discovered as a result of the 
confession.”42  The provision echoes the decision in R v. Warwickshall, 
where the defendant made an inadmissible confession that indicated that 
stolen goods were to be found in her bed.43  They were indeed found 
there, and the evidence that they had been was held to be admissible.44  
The moral ambivalence of Warwickshall and section 76 of PACE has 
practical consequences which are probably becoming more significant 
with advances being made in forensic science.  Physical evidence obtained 
from an inadmissible confession will not in every case be discovered in a 
 36. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76A(2)(b). 
 37. See, e.g., Wong Kam-Ming v. The Queen, [1980] A.C. 247 (P.C. 1978) (appeal 
taken from H.K.); R v. Brophy, [1982] A.C. 476 (H.L. 1981) (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 
 38. [1982] 2 A.C. at 481.  This argument, however, was held not to apply if the 
admissions made at the voir dire are entirely gratuitous, such as when they are made out 
of bravado.  Id. 
 39. Wong Kam-Ming, [1980] A.C. at 248. 
 40. Id. at 247–48. 
 41. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 35, para. 56. 
 42. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76A(4). 
 43. (1783) 1 Leach 262, 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234. 
 44. Id. 




location connected with the defendant and thereby incriminate him.  But 
as DNA collection and matching becomes more sophisticated, links between 
that evidence and the defendant are becoming easier to establish.  There 
is an incentive for the unscrupulous investigator to extract information 
from the suspect using illicit methods of interrogation.   
Clearly, the issues of fairness and the moral integrity of the criminal 
justice system are complex ones.  For a confession remains inadmissible 
notwithstanding that the facts appear to confirm it as accurate.  Under 
Warwickshall, and now section 76A(5) of PACE, the court may not be 
told even in general terms that the defendant had indicated where the 
incriminating articles might be found.45 An ambivalent attitude to 
reliability may be perceived in that, while courts will exclude improperly 
obtained confessions notwithstanding that they are true, surprisingly 
little attention is paid to the accuracy of verdicts reached on the basis of 
confession evidence.  English law has made few concessions to the results 
of research into the psychology behind an innocent person confessing to 
the police.  Although it is clear that the experience of being held on 
arrest and questioned by police is inevitably intimidating and stressful,46 
courts seem to have little sympathy for defendants who cannot cope.47  
The confession will not necessarily be excluded from evidence.  Section 
76A(2)(b) of PACE applies only when something was “said or done” to 
the suspect that could have rendered the confession unreliable; therefore, 
a confession obtained in consequence of anxiety alone or even illness 
falls outside its scope, unless the police have behaved improperly.48  A 
defense argument that such a confession should be excluded, therefore, 
can be made only under section 78 of PACE.49
The discretionary nature of section 78 of PACE inevitably renders 
trials somewhat unpredictable.  We see similar cases producing different 
results in R v. Kilner and R v. McKenzie.50  In Kilner, the defendant had 
a low IQ, epilepsy, and became hysterical when he found himself in 
difficulties.51  There had been no misconduct by the police, but the 
 45. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76A(5).  It is possible that an 
officer witness might try to suggest a connection between an inadmissible confession and 
the discovery of physical evidence by close juxtaposition of the two in his testimony, as 
in, “I interviewed the defendant.  I immediately proceeded to the churchyard and dug 
underneath the third tree on the left.” 
 46. See, e.g., BARRIE IRVING & LINDEN HILGENDORF, POLICE INTERROGATION: THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 28–34 (1980). 
 47. See, e.g., R v. Fulling, [1987] Q.B. 426 (C.A. 1987). 
 48. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76A(2)(b); R v. Goldenberg, 
(1989) 88 Crim. App. 285. 
 49. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 78. 
 50. R v. Kilner, [1976] Crim. L.R. 740; R v. McKenzie, (1993) 1 W.L.R. 453. 
 51. [1976] Crim. L.R. 740, 740. 
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confession was not admitted in evidence.52  In contrast, the trial judge in 
McKenzie did not exclude the defendant’s confession under section 78 of 
PACE.53  McKenzie had been arrested on suspicion of arson, which he 
duly admitted in his interview.54  Unprompted, he then went on to confess 
to twelve murders, ten of which the police did not believe he had 
committed.55  He was nevertheless tried for the remaining two murders 
although there was no other evidence to implicate him.56  On hearing the 
confession evidence, the jury convicted him of manslaughter.57  The 
defense appealed.58  In the Court of Appeal, Professor Gudjonsson gave 
expert evidence to the effect that the defendant, who was thirty-eight 
years old, had an IQ of between 73 and 76 and had a guilt obsession due 
to having been sexually abused as a child.59  The defendant had a suggestible 
and compliant personality of a kind to undermine the reliability of confessions 
made.60  McKenzie’s manslaughter convictions were quashed.61
The Court of Appeal considered that the confessions to murder should 
have been excluded under section 78 of PACE, but went further in 
declaring that in any trial where the prosecution case rests wholly upon a 
confession made by a defendant who suffers from a significant degree of 
mental handicap and the confession is unconvincing to the point where a 
properly directed jury could not properly convict upon it, the judge 
should exclude the confession, and in view of the lack of any other 
evidence of guilt, stop the case altogether.62  Expert evidence on the 
reliability of the confession will be heard in relation to defendants with a 
personality disorder or learning difficulties.63
In Gudjonsson’s typology of a false confession, a confession which is 
unprompted and entirely false, as were at least some of McKenzie’s 
 52. Id. 
 53. (1993) 1 W.L.R. at 454. 
 54. The Practitioner: NLJ Law Reports—R v. McKenzie, 142 NEW LAW JOURNAL 
1162 (1992). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, 
CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY 243 (1992); McKenzie, (1993) 1 W.L.R. at 454, 455. 
 57. The Practitioner, supra note 54, at 1162; GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 245–
46; McKenzie, (1993) 1 W.L.R. at 453. 
 58. McKenzie, (1993) 1 W.L.R. at 454. 
 59. The Practitioner, supra note 54, at 1162; GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 244. 
 60. The Practitioner, supra note 54, at 1162. 
 61. McKenzie, (1993) 1 W.L.R. at 455. 
 62. Id. 
 63. R v. Ward, (1993) 2 All E.R. 577, 578. 




admissions of murder, is “voluntary.”64  Highly publicized crimes are 
usually the target for voluntary confessions.65  For example, “[w]hen 
Charles Lindberg’s baby was kidnapped and murdered in 1932, more 
than 200 people offered unsolicited confessions.”66  This kind of behaviour 
may be motivated by a desire for notoriety, or to relieve a general feeling 
of guilt, or may reflect an inability to distinguish fact and fantasy.67  Judith 
Ward claimed to be a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and 
drew the attention of police officers to this supposed connection every 
time she got the opportunity.68  In the aftermaths of IRA bombings she 
was sometimes to be found at the scene screaming abuse at the police.69  
She confessed to planting a bomb that blew up a coach on a motorway.70  
At her trial, she claimed that she could not remember making the 
admission, and that in any event it was not true.71  She was nevertheless 
convicted, and spent several years in prison.72  Her appeal against 
conviction was allowed, partly because of expert testimony that she was 
a hysteric, unable to distinguish fantasy from reality.73
The majority of false confessions, according to Gudjonsson, are 
“coerced-compliant,” motivated by the desire to escape from a highly 
stressful situation.74  The immediate gain, frequently nothing more than 
the need to establish some short-term certainty of future events, becomes 
a more powerful influence on the subject’s behaviour than the more 
uncertain long-term effects of the confession, even if the allegation 
concerns a serious offense.75  Wagenaar also found that false confessions 
commonly involve the suspect taking an apparently easy way out, not 
anticipating the long-term consequences, perhaps thinking it will be 
possible to retract later.76  Other instances include suspects having to take 
the only way out because the pressure means they simply cannot carry 
on, and suspects simply being outwitted by the questioner—a likely 
 64. Gisli H. Gudjonsson & James MacKeith, Retracted confessions: legal, psychological 
and psychiatric aspects, 28 MED. SCI. & L. 187, 190 (1988). 
 65. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions, 57 MEDICO-LEGAL 
J. 93, 101 (1989). 
 66. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 89, 89 (1988). 
 67. Gudjonsson & MacKeith, supra note 64, at 190. 
 68. Ward, (1993) 2 All E.R. at 582–84, 587–88. 
 69. Id. at 584. 
 70. Id. at 587, 589. 
 71. Id. at 583. 
 72. Id. at 577. 
 73. Id. at 577, 578, 637. 
 74. GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 227. 
 75. Gudjonsson & MacKeith, supra note 64, at 191; Gudjonsson, supra note 65, at 
101. 
 76. WILLEM A. WAGENAAR, PETER J. VAN KOPPEN & HANS F.M. CROMBAG, ANCHORED 
NARRATIVES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 109 (1993). 
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enough event in the atmosphere of police custody, which inflicts a form 
of sensory deprivation.77  A third category of confession in the Gudjonsson 
typology is “coerced-internalised.”78  People who do not trust their own 
memory may begin to accept the suggestions of the police and become 
temporarily persuaded that they might have, or did indeed, commit the 
crime.  Gudjonsson and MacKeith argue that interrogative suggestibility and 
compliance are enduring psychological characteristics relevant to erroneous 
testimony.79  During police questioning, such traits may cause false 
admissions to be made, and these could form the basis of a conviction.  
Suggestibility is a tendency to accept uncritically information communicated 
during questions.80  It is greatest in people of low intelligence.81
McKenzie provides a small safeguard against a false confession leading to 
a miscarriage of justice.  The decision applies only where there is no other 
evidence to suggest that the confession is true.82  Numerous cases where 
a false confession appeared to be confirmed by circumstantial or other 
evidence linking the suspect to the crime, some of which are described in 
Gudjonsson’s book, suggest that it is relatively easy to find “supporting” 
evidence.83  It is worrisome that courts do not appear to feel obliged to 
stop the case if, for example, this supporting evidence consists of no 
more than the level of detail in the confession.  In R v. Bailey the suspect 
suffered from a serious learning disability.84  She confessed to a friend, 
and then to police, that she was responsible for a fire in which an elderly 
woman died.85  There was no appropriate adult86 present at her interview 
with the police, who were not aware of Bailey’s disability.87  She later 
retracted the confession she had made to the police, but then confessed 
again in the presence of a solicitor and a social worker.88  The prosecution 
 77. Id. 
 78. GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 228. 
 79. Gudjonsson & MacKeith, supra note 64, at 190. 
 80. Id. 
 81. WAGENAAR ET AL., supra note 76, at 110. 
 82. R v. McKenzie, (1993) 1 W.L.R. 453, 455. 
 83. Such as the notorious cases of the “Guildford Four” and the “Birmingham 
Six.”  GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 260–73. 
 84. Special Jury Warning Required: Law Report R v. Bailey, THE TIMES, Jan. 26, 
1995, at 38, available at 1995 WLNR 4305364.
 85. Id.
 86. Id.  The presence of an appropriate adult is a PACE Code of Practice 
requirement in relation to vulnerable suspects.  Code of Practice for the Detention, 
Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, 2005, para. 11.15 (Eng.). 
 87. Special Jury Warning Required, supra note 84, at 38.
 88. Id. 




was allowed to go forward, despite the evidence of a learning disability, 
on the ground that she displayed such remorse and the later confession 
contained so much detail that the jury should consider it.89
Should the court decide that a particular confession is admissible, the 
defense is nevertheless entitled to put it to the finder of fact that the 
circumstances in which it was made render it so unreliable that it should 
be discounted.90  To this end they may call on expert evidence as long as the 
accused does not occupy the category of the “normal” individual, whose 
likely reaction to interrogation the magistrates or jurors are apparently 
entirely capable of assessing for themselves.91  Expert evidence on the 
reliability of the confession is allowed for defendants with a personality 
disorder or learning difficulties, but the judgment in R v. Ward refers to 
personality disorders “so severe as properly to be categorised as mental 
disorder[s].”92  Moreover, even if expert evidence is heard in such a case, 
the jury should be directed that they do not have to accept it.93  If a confession 
is allowed to go to the jury, there is a substantial risk that they will disregard 
the expert evidence and convict.  The intuitive notion that confessions are 
strong evidence of guilt is difficult to dispel.  Acquittals following confession 
evidence are rare.94  Although mock jurors are likely to disregard confessions 
obtained after threats of violence from the police, they tend to act on those 
obtained in response to an offer of leniency, even if given an explanation 
of the relationship between hopes of advantage and involuntariness in 
law.95   
In Scotland and Holland, as in many United States jurisdictions, no 
one can be convicted on the strength of a confession alone.  Although 
the psychological literature appears to establish clearly that confessions 
are not reliable indicators of guilt, criminal justice systems rely heavily 
upon them.  French legal culture does not recognise the psychology of false 
confessions at all.96  Other systems are reluctant to change their practice.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Wong Kam-Ming v. The Queen, [1980] A.C. 247, 248, 259 (P.C. 1978) (appeal 
taken from H.K.). 
 91. R v. Ward, (1993) 2 All E.R. 577, 639–41. 
 92. Id. at 641. 
 93. Expert Evidence on Those Who Make False Confessions: Law Report R v. 
O’Brien, THE TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at 25, available at 2000 WLNR 3122803.
 94. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, CONFESSIONS IN CROWN COURT 
TRIALS: RESEARCH STUDY NO. 5, at 19 (1980); Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wakefield, 
False Confessions and Police Deception, 10 AM. J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 49, 54–55 
(1992). 
 95. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67, 84–85, 87 (Saul M. Kassin & 
Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds. 1985). 
 96. Jacqueline Hodgson, Codified Criminal Procedure and Human Rights: Some 
Observations on the French Experience, 2003 CRIM. L. REV. 165, 178. 
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Wagenaar argues that this is because confessions intuitively appear to be 
reliable.97  Also, there is often a good fit between the prosecution narrative 
and the confession.  Yet, that may be because the police are employing 
the narrative at the time they decide whom to interview.  Denials will be 
disregarded because they do not fit.  In Wagenaar’s study, seven disputed 
confessions were retracted, but were treated as if their diagnostic value 
was as high as before the retractions.98  He concludes: 
To beat the confession, the retraction needs to be a narrative containing at least 
three components or sub-stories: (a) one which explains why the initial 
confession was made although being false; (b) one offering a likely alternative 
suspect and explaining why that other person did it and/or why the suspect 
himself could not have done it, and (c) one that explains why the prosecution’s 
story, that the defence counsel persuaded the defendant to retract his confession, 
is not true.99
Most retractions fail all three criteria.100
IV.  NO MATTER HOW POISONED THE TREE 
When A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department came before 
English judges, they had little to guide them but the ambiguous and 
contradictory legal approach of criminal courts to improperly obtained 
confession evidence.101  Despite Lord Bingham’s declaration that the 
issue before the House of Lords was a matter of constitutional principle 
rather than of the law of evidence, their Lordships’ decision bears a 
remarkable resemblance to the latter body of doctrine.102  Despite the 
abhorrence shown for five hundred years by English law for torture “and 
its fruits,”103 there was no enthusiasm amongst some of their Lordships 
to exclude physical evidence obtained in consequence of an inadmissible 
confession, no matter how brutal the method of interrogation: 
 97. WAGENAAR ET AL., supra note 76, at 114. 
 98. Id. at 112, 114. 
 99. Id. at 114. 
 100. Id. 
 101. [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 (H.L. 2005) (appeal taken from U.K.). 
 102. Id. at 270. 
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As for the rule that we do not necessarily exclude the “fruit of the poisoned 
tree,” but admit relevant evidence discovered in consequence of inadmissible 
confessions, this is the way we strike a necessary balance between preserving 
the integrity of the judicial process and the public interest in convicting the 
guilty.104
Although section 76A(4) of PACE did not apply to the case, and 
arguably neither did the common law, Lord Hoffman at any rate would 
be content to follow Warwickshall and allow into evidence, before any 
court or tribunal, evidence obtained as a result of torture.105  Shunning  
the dangerously thin air of the highest of moral high grounds, Lord 
Hoffman considered such physical evidence not only reliable, but 
conveniently, not to  “carry enough of the smell of the torture chamber to 
require its exclusion.”106  Whether such views are supported by other 
members of the House is not clear; the common law has yet to decide 
whether fairness to the accused, or the need to protect the moral integrity 
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